Files
tony 36118b4a4f fix(security): harden owner pair-code against brute-force
- Set express trust proxy=1 so req.ip is the real client (one Dokku
  nginx hop). Drop the X-Forwarded-For fallback — it was client-spoofable.
- Add a global redeem rate limit (30/min across all IPs) so rotating
  proxies can't outpace the per-IP limiter.
- Every failed redeem now decrements life from all active pair codes
  via a shared failures counter. After 5 wrong guesses during a code's
  5-minute TTL, the owner's real code gets burned and they must re-mint.
  This makes the 20-bit entropy of a 6-digit code defensible: an
  attacker doesn't know which code is real and can't probe long enough
  to find it before triggering the burn.
2026-06-01 10:16:30 +01:00

83 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript

import 'dotenv/config';
import express from 'express';
import cors from 'cors';
import helmet from 'helmet';
import cookieParser from 'cookie-parser';
import path from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { env } from './config/env.js';
import { logger } from './lib/logger.js';
import chatRoutes from './routes/chat.js';
import tripsRoutes from './routes/trips.js';
import teslaRoutes from './routes/tesla.js';
import ownerRoutes from './routes/owner.js';
import { warnIfMisconfigured as warnOwnerAuth } from './lib/ownerAuth.js';
import { createOptionalAuth } from './lib/auth.js';
const app = express();
// We sit behind one Nginx hop (Dokku's per-app vhost). Trust exactly one
// proxy so req.ip reflects the real client and the rate limiters below
// can't be bypassed via a spoofed X-Forwarded-For header.
app.set('trust proxy', 1);
app.use(helmet({ contentSecurityPolicy: false }));
app.use(cors({ origin: env.appUrl, credentials: true }));
app.use(express.json({ limit: '2mb' }));
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use((req, _res, next) => {
if (req.url !== '/health') logger.info({ method: req.method, url: req.url }, 'request');
next();
});
app.get('/health', (_req, res) => {
res.json({ status: 'ok', service: 'tesla-roadtrip', time: new Date().toISOString() });
});
const auth = createOptionalAuth();
if (auth) {
app.use(auth.middleware());
app.use(auth.routes());
logger.info('Auth middleware mounted (AUTH_SECRET present)');
} else {
logger.info('Auth disabled — set AUTH_SECRET to enable user accounts');
}
// Owner auth + Tesla integration. Tesla routes are owner-gated except the
// public .well-known partner-key path. Owner routes handle login/logout.
warnOwnerAuth();
app.use(ownerRoutes);
app.use(teslaRoutes);
app.use('/api', chatRoutes);
app.use('/api/trips', tripsRoutes);
// ─── Static client (production only) ─────────────────────────────────────────
// In dev, Vite serves the client on :5173. In production (Dokku), the built
// client lands in client/dist via `npm run build` and we serve it from here.
const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);
const clientDist = path.resolve(__dirname, '../../client/dist');
if (existsSync(clientDist)) {
app.use(express.static(clientDist, { index: false, maxAge: '1h' }));
app.get(/.*/, (req, res, next) => {
// Don't shadow API or well-known paths.
if (req.path.startsWith('/api') || req.path.startsWith('/.well-known')) return next();
res.sendFile(path.join(clientDist, 'index.html'));
});
logger.info({ clientDist }, 'Serving built client');
} else {
logger.info('No client/dist found — relying on Vite dev server');
}
app.use((err: Error, _req: express.Request, res: express.Response, _next: express.NextFunction) => {
logger.error({ err }, 'Unhandled error');
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
});
app.listen(env.port, () => {
logger.info(`Tesla Roadtrip server running on port ${env.port}`);
});